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ABSTRACT 
AEGIS: VALIDATING EXECUTION BEHAVIOR OF CONTROLLER 
APPLICATIONS IN SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKS 
 
by Hitesh M. Padekar 
The software-defined network (SDN) controller provides an application programming 
interface (API) for network applications and controller modules.  Malicious applications 
and network attackers can misuse these APIs to cause outbreaks on the controller.  The 
controller is the heart of the SDN and should be secured from such API misuse scenarios 
and network attacks.  Most of the prior research in security for SDN controllers focuses 
on a defense mechanism for a particular attack scenario that requires changes in the 
controller code.  This research proposes dynamic access control and a policy engine-
based approach for protecting the SDN controller from network attacks and application 
bugs, thus defending against the misuse of the controller APIs.  The proposed AEGIS 
protects controller APIs and defines a set of access, semantic, syntactic and 
communication policy rules and a permission set for accessing controller APIs. It utilizes 
the traditional API hooking technique to control API usage.  We generated various attack 
scenarios that included application bugs and network attacks on the Floodlight SDN 
controller and showed that applying AEGIS secured the Floodlight controller APIs and 
hence protected them from network attacks and application bugs.  Finally, we discuss 
performance comparison tests of the new AEGIS controller implementation for memory 
usage, API execution time and boot-up time and conclude that AEGIS effectively 
protects the SDN controller for trustworthy operations.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction to Software-Defined Networking (SDN) 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging architecture that provides a 
dynamic, manageable, cost-effective and adaptable network.  This architecture decouples 
the network control and forwarding functions, enabling the network control to become 
directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications 
and network services.  In this environment, a controller acts as the “brain” of the whole 
network, whereas the data plane consisting of switches does the forwarding job as 
instructed by the controller.  
SDN has provisioned networks with improved scalability, faster network application 
rollouts and better network management.  Current network devices and infrastructure 
need to be configured manually, and network control and data planes are tightly coupled.  
Due to this legacy, the network is not very scalable, and it is difficult to deploy new 
features to the network as control and data planes are tightly coupled.  SDN decouples the 
control and data plane of the network, keeps the controlling logic at the central point, and 
hides the complexity of the underlying network’s physical topologies.  This makes the 
network more flexible for new applications deployment and easier to manage. 
 
1.1  Features of SDN 
Today’s network is complex, manual, low level and error-prone.  The network keeps 
on changing dynamically as new users and devices need provisioning [1].  Even a 
campus network is difficult to manage.  The configuration is static and is not integrated 
with the network very well.  Separate devices are required for performing different 
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functions.  The configuration and management of the network are decentralized.  It is 
very difficult for network administrators to manage large networks and deployment of 
new services may take days or even months. 
SDN provides an easier and more flexible system for network management.  The 
controller has a centralized view of the overall network [3].  Thus, any change in the 
network configuration such as adding or removing of devices can be very easily handled 
in SDN.  The network administrator does not need to go to each individual device in the 
network to modify the configuration.  Instead, configuring the changes in the controller 
would deploy the modifications on the entire network.  An SDN facilitates 
communication between the applications and the network.  This results in a dynamic 
network for a dynamic application [6]. 
SDN provides various features as compared to legacy systems: 
a) Logically centralized system for network management 
b) Simpler and less error prone due to changes in the network [2] 
c) Logically separate networks can exist on the same physical devices 
d) Reduces the need to purchase purposely built networking hardware [3] 
e) Provides an abstraction by freeing the applications from underlying low level 
complexity [4] 
f) Automates the application configuration tasks [4] 
g) Rapid innovation through the ability to deliver new network capabilities and 
services without configuring individual devices [5] 
h) Increased network reliability [5] 
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i) More accurate network control 
 
1.2  Working of SDN 
The OpenFlow protocol is a foundational element for building SDN solutions.  It is a 
layer 2 communications protocol which focuses on separating the control path from the 
forwarding path in order to allow better traffic management than that available through 
the access-control lists maintained by routers and switches.  OpenFlow also provides a 
standard framework for network component programmability. 
The OpenFlow-enabled switches contain flow rule tables which forward the received 
packets.  When a new packet arrives at the switch, it looks into the flow table for 
instructions called flow rules of the action to be performed on the packet.  If it does not 
find any matching flow rule, the packet is then sent to the controller.  The controller 
processes the packet and marks the packet with an action like “drop the packet and 
similar packets,” “forward the packet and similar packets,” “send it to normal 
processing.” 
The SDN environment uses a set of application programming interfaces (APIs), 
which support the services and applications running on the network [3].  These APIs play 
a major role in the controller functionality and provide efficient service orchestration and 
automation. 
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Fig. 1.  Architecture of SDN network operating system 
 
Software-defined networking can be divided into three layered architectures:  
network applications, controller platform, and physical and virtual devices.  All together 
this is called a network operating system (NOS) since this architecture is very similar to a 
computer operating system.  Figure 1 describes the network operating system’s 
architecture.  Network applications are at the very top layer and contain applications for 
network management, control and monitoring; many more applications could be possible.   
The controller platform is the middle layer which acts like an operating system core 
kernel and provides the framework for building applications and controls network 
devices.  It provides a set of APIs to the application layer and implements protocols to 
communicate with underlying devices.  Physical and virtual devices are at the bottom 
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layer, which consists of devices such as switches, routers and virtual entities of the 
network. 
 
1.3  SDN Controller 
The SDN controller is the main strategic control logic of the network and it plays an 
important role inside SDN networks.  The SDN controller sends information to the 
switches and routers using Southbound APIs and talks to the applications running on top 
of it using Northbound APIs.  It uses well-known interfaces such as OpenFlow, Netconf, 
and Open Virtual Switch Database (OVSDB) for the southbound API’s communication.  
Whereas, the OSGi framework and REST are used for the northbound API’s 
communication.  The SDN controller achieves modularity in the software by providing 
interfaces to pluggable modules.  Using a plug-in interface new modules can be inserted 
into the controller at runtime for performing network tasks. 
The controller has core modules which are responsible for functions such as 
topology management, device tracking, statistics management, flow rule management 
and link discovery.  These core modules are accessible to other modules and applications 
through provided APIs.  These APIs have input parameters and output or return 
parameters.  If the network and applications are behaving legitimately then these 
parameter values are within certain boundary limits and we can predict the values.  
During the network attack these values changes substantially. 
The aim of developing the SDN controller is to provide a platform for deploying 
SDN applications and provide a framework for developing an SDN application.  Below 
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are the basic requirements for building an SDN controller provided by the OpenDaylight 
SDN controller community [10]. 
1. Flexibility:  various applications should be able to run on the controller and use 
the common functionality that the controller has provided.  That means the 
generic APIs should be able to accommodate various applications’ needs. 
2. Scale the development process:  controller applications and modules can be 
dynamically plugged into the controller, hence the architecture should allow them 
to be developed independently.  This helps in independent development between 
teams. 
3. Run-time extensibility:  the architecture should allow insertion of new 
applications, modules, services and protocols at runtime.  This is required for no 
controller shutdown and to adopt new changes easily. 
4. Performance and scale:  controller stability for various network loads and 
applications is very important.  The controller architecture should be scalable 
without sacrificing the modularity in design. 
 
1.4  Securing SDN Controller 
If the controller has any vulnerabilities in its design and implementation, then the 
entire network will be unsecured and can be under control of the attacker.  Many 
approaches have been proposed for making the controller more secure.  FortNOX is an 
implementation for the NOX controller and it proposes role-based authorization and 
security constraint enforcement for the controller kernel [20].  AvantGuard provides 
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protection against data-to-control-plane saturation attacks such as TCP SYN Flood [21].  
TopoGuard shows how simple API misuse scenarios and network attacks can lead to 
failure of the SDN controller [11].  Rosemary implements a secure network operating 
system [13].  However, these approaches are more specific to network attacks and 
concentrate on authorization of network usage, application development and conflict 
resolution.  A few of them have considerable performance overhead and they are not the 
right choice for implementing on the SDN controllers in the field. 
In this work, we implemented an API protection framework which hooks the 
controller APIs at runtime and check the input-output parameters against the set of rules 
defined by AEGIS.  Each call to the controller API will be monitored by AEGIS at 
runtime and checked for syntactic, semantic, access and communication policy rules. 
Using this, an API misuse case will be logged and unsolicited requests will be dropped.  
We implemented AEGIS on the Floodlight SDN controller and showed the experiment’s 
results.  As a proof of concept, we generated three attack scenarios and implemented a 
policy engine to provide a defense mechanism against these attack scenarios.  Our attack 
scenarios involved an application bug, a network attack from the network devices and a 
protocol vulnerability between an SDN controller and a switch.  Also, we studied three 
other attack scenario with network attacks and application bugs for which we have 
proposed a protection mechanism using our AEGIS policy engine. 
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Chapter 2:  Motivation with Background 
For SDN networks, the controller has been a target for the attackers.  DDoS and 
SYN Flood are awkward type of attacks that mainly focus on abusing the SDN controller.  
Network applications also can make use of controller APIs to generate traffic, perform 
malicious activities and make changes in the network topology.  Controller applications 
with software faults lead to failure in the controller’s functionality.  Scenarios in the past 
show that unintentionally called controller APIs may lead to serious issues for the 
controller such as exhausting resources, bringing down the SDN controller and changing 
the controller information.   
 
2.1  Background 
Avant-Guard is a data layer implementation which addresses two challenges of the 
OpenFlow protocol vulnerability at the SDN controller [7].  First, it proposes that a 
communication bottleneck between the control and data plane may lead to a control plane 
saturation attack.  Solution for this attack is to move the logic for the connection 
establishment from the control plane to the data plane, and once the complete connection 
is established, then this connection is migrated to the control plane.  Second, actuating 
triggers are inserted by the control layer on the data layer, and Avant-Guard 
asynchronously notifies the control layer if any event triggers configured flow rules in the 
data layer.  However, this does not address SDN controller layer issues and does not 
prevent any attacks by SDN applications. 
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Rosemary implements a robust and secure network operating system [13].  The 
researchers demonstrated how simple and common failures in the network application 
may lead to serious issues on the SDN controller and sometimes complete breakage of 
the SDN control plane.  They introduced containers for network applications and 
implemented a policy engine for the application permission structure. However, they do 
not have a provision to dynamically change policies for the application permission and 
resource usage. 
TopoGuard proposes new attack scenarios based on spoofing attacks such as an ARP 
poisoning attack [11].  It showed how poisoning of the network topology will affect the 
higher-level controller services.  It implemented a man-in-the-middle attack, a host-
location-hijacking attack and a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.  The researchers 
introduced real-time detection and an automated solution for the network poisoning 
attack and implemented the TopoGuard for the SDN controller.  To create one such 
attack, they targeted one of the controller APIs which was returning true values in either 
case, and did not perform any validation of the request.  They successfully implemented 
one attack scenario of a host hijacking by abusing this vulnerable controller API.  
However, this implementation did not prevent such an API misuse scenario or a method 
to detect any such vulnerabilities in the controller code. 
The policy engine for the AMI protocol implements a set of rules and prevents 
malware from abusing the core APIs [14].  Creating a set of rules and access policies for 
the controller APIs will prevent such attacks.  We need to monitor the controller APIs’ 
access at runtime and the policy engine should protect it from being mishandled.  This 
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engine should be dynamically configurable so that any future requirement to enable or 
disable access to the controller APIs can be granted or denied.   
 Read, notification, write and system access permissions are also defined for the 
OpenFlow applications [15].  The controller and apps are isolated in thread containers 
and an access control layer is introduced in between the applications and the operating 
system (OS).  Although this is good idea for providing access policies for applications, it 
does not provide a method to dynamically control access for the OpenFlow applications 
and provide security against network attacks. 
 Permissions and policies can be defined for accessing flow rules and other data 
structures; however, this does not help to protect the controller from network attacks [12].  
Also, prior research mainly focuses on security for the northbound interface and anomaly 
detection [16].  This thesis concentrated on the controller core module API’s security and 
misuse cases as these are called both from the north-bound as well as south-bound APIs. 
The technique is also been proposed by the prior researchers that focuses on 
protecting the network flows and presents an access control scheme, based on the 
OpenFlow model, for accessing the switches’ flow tables and their entries [17].  
However, our study shows that a similar feature is already implemented in the 
OpenDaylight controller’s latest release.  However, this thesis had proposed an idea to 
protect the APIs which operate on flow rules, for example protecting the forwarding rules 
manager’s API and defining access policies for these APIs. 
OperationCheckpoint presents an approach to secure the northbound interface by 
introducing a permission system that ensures that controller operations are available to 
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trusted applications only [18].  OperationCheckpoint is an attempt to make north-bound 
APIs secure and it defines the permissions for applications for using these APIs.  
However; it does not make any attempt to secure the controller core modules from 
network attacks. 
Most of the prior work to provide security for the SDN controller involves changes 
in the controller code.  Changing the controller code might be acceptable for some 
developers; however, it may not be acceptable for other owners of the code.  The added 
extra code needs to be tested for all the positive and negative test scenarios, and in some 
cases this may lead to an addition of bugs.  The prior security solutions are designed on a 
case-by-case basis and do not demonstrate a generic approach which can be used for all 
scenarios.  Defining an access policy for API usage is an important aspect of providing 
security for the controller.  However, most of the prior designs propose a static approach 
that is applicable for a particular scenario and lacks scalability for a generic case.  We 
discuss each of these aspects in detail in subsequent sections. 
 
2.2  Motivation 
We propose a security framework which can be applied to a controller API and has a 
generic way to configure the API usage and define a set of policies for the API.  We 
identified the controller’s important APIs for Floodlight and OpenDaylight SDN 
controllers.  Then, we define a set of access, static and dynamic policies for these APIs.  
We used Spring and AspectJ API hooking techniques to dynamically hook the controller 
APIs [26], [27].  The hooked APIs then invoke the policy engine to further apply the 
22 
 
defined policies for the APIs.  We implement the hooked APIs and policy engine on the 
Floodlight controller.  Our study shows that this architecture can be ported to all the 
leading SDN controllers in the market.   
Below are the proposed set of requirements that controller security framework should 
have. 
2.2.1  Dynamic Access Control Framework  
The OpenDaylight community currently has more than 20 open source 
applications and modules and many propriety applications.  Changing the code for each 
of these applications may not be feasible and it adds more overhead to each of these 
applications.  The controller code is very sensitive and any code which is not completely 
tested will add a bug in the controller and may lead to serious issues.  The approach for 
providing dynamic access control should be such that it does not require any changes in 
the controller or application code.   We implemented a hooking technique which allows 
us to hook the controller APIs at runtime and execute our policy engine which provides 
access control for applications.  Using this approach, the access permission can be 
changed at runtime. 
2.2.2  No Downtime for the Controller 
Most of the access control approaches proposed in the past require applications 
and a controller code to be re-compiled before running them all together.  Although, 
controllers such as OpenDaylight allow applications and controller modules to be loaded 
dynamically at runtime, prior approaches needs the controller to go down before adding 
an access control framework.  Bringing the SDN controller down may be very costly and 
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should be avoided.  OpenDaylight allows runtime up-gradation of the controller modules 
and features.  Our implementation address this issue as we need do not to compile 
complete the controller code.  We need only compile the modules individually and load 
them dynamically while the controller is live. 
2.2.3  Changing Permission Set for the Controller Data  
 None of the prior approaches allow changing access policies at runtime; the 
policies enforced for an application are static and cannot be configured at runtime.  For 
example, suppose one application does not have access to flow rules in version 1; 
however, the next version of this application may need to access the flow rules 
legitimately.  To make any changes in access control for these legitimate applications, we 
need to make changes in the controller code.  In prior approaches, this required the 
controller to shut down, make changes in access control and bring it up again.  In our 
design, we can enable/disable a permission set for this application dynamically and 
change access control for any application dynamically without making any application / 
controller module to shut down. 
2.2.4  Network Attacks prevention 
As demonstrated in [11] and [13]; abusing the controller APIs can generate 
network attack and application misuse scenarios.  We also implement API hooks with 
Floodlight which can be used for preventing such misuse of the controller APIs and 
hence prevent network attacks. 
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To summarize, past approaches for implementing the access control layer were 
more static based and less dynamic.  We propose a design which allows us to 
dynamically control the access policies with no controller shutdown.  
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Chapter 3:  Goals of the Thesis 
Intentional or unintentional malicious behavior of the network application and 
network attacks should not cause network breakdown and controller failure.  The 
controller assumes that the network applications are stable and provides its APIs for 
manipulating controller data.  However, application layer software issues should not 
cause control layer instability.  Network attacks should not affect the controller module’s 
internal information.  The goal of this thesis was to propose and prototype a scalable 
mechanism which can be applied to the SDN controller operating system to make it 
secure from such attacks.  We defined clear access policies and rules for accessing 
controller APIs and have a mechanism to change it dynamically.  The major goals were 
1. Create scenarios for misusing controller APIs using network applications misuse 
and network attacks 
a. Make a network attack on the southbound APIs of the SDN controller modules 
and show that network attacks can also misuse controller APIs 
b. Generate network attacks to manipulate topology information 
c. Generate an attack scenario for a network application misusing controller APIs 
2. Design a system to protect controller APIs 
3. Prototype AEGIS which protects controller APIs from such misuse scenarios 
a. Apply an API hooking technique to take over the controller APIs and run policy 
engine to validate API usage 
4. Define static and dynamic policies for the information maintained by the controller 
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a. Identify invariant and variant information of the controller and define policies to 
maintain the integrity of this information 
b. Detect if there are any information usage violations on the controller 
5. Invoke a policy engine for monitoring controller API usage 
a. Identify rules which are applicable for the controller API and invoke 
corresponding policy rules validation upon controller pre and/or post API call 
6. Make the policies configurable at runtime so that the network administrator has full 
control of these policies 
a. The network administrator should have control of these policies and they should 
be dynamically configurable and controlled by the administrator 
 
In this work, we implemented an API protection framework which hooks the 
controller APIs at runtime and checks the input-output parameters against the set of rules 
defined by AEGIS.  Each call to the controller API was monitored by AEGIS at runtime 
and checked for syntactic, semantic, access policy and communication policy rules.  Each 
API misuse case was logged and unsolicited requests were dropped.  We have 
implemented AEGIS on the Floodlight controller.  We have also protected access to 
important controller data structures such as flow tables, statistics information and 
network configuration information. 
The policy engine for AMI protocol implements a set of rules and prevents malware 
from abusing the core APIs [14].  Creating a set of rules and access policies for the 
controller APIs will prevent such attacks.  We need to monitor the controller API’s 
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access at runtime and the policy engine should protect it from being mishandled.  This 
engine should be dynamically configurable so that any future requirement to enable or 
disable access to the controller APIs can be granted or denied. 
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Chapter 4:  Threat Model and Case Studies 
Most of the open source controllers contain a set of core modules which define the 
controller’s major functionality.  The proposed attack model targets these core modules 
and causes an outbreak on these controller core modules.  We targeted the attack 
scenarios defined in the prior research and created similar attack scenarios for the 
Floodlight controller.  With the help of AEGIS implementation we demonstrated that 
such attacks can be prevented.  We identified that topology manager, device manager, 
statistic manager, host tracker and switch manager are the core controller modules.  
Below is the list of attacks we developed for misusing these controller APIs.  This 
includes implementation of a defense mechanism using AEGIS policy engine. 
 
4.1  Application Misuse Scenarios 
The applications invoke controller APIs with input arguments to the API, and in 
return, the applications receive the result of the operation in the form of the output value 
of the API.  Application misuse scenarios involve network applications inadvertently 
calling the controller APIs, thus resulting in the controller breakdown, as discussed 
below. 
4.1.1  Crashing the SDN Controller 
In this scenario of attack, the controller application or module calls the 
System.exit() function inadvertently to suddenly exit the controller.  Such an attack has 
been implemented on Floodlight and other controllers [13].  This experiment’s results 
show that the controller shuts down completely and applying AEGIS policy engine for 
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the System.exit() function on the Floodlight controller prevents such an API misuse 
scenario.  AEGIS implements an access permission for calling the System.exit() API, and 
inside the hook for this API it checks for the access permission. 
4.1.2  Poisoning Internal Data of the Controller 
In this attack scenario, the vulnerable application is changing the controller’s 
internal information, such as the network link information.  We identified the controller 
APIs which were being misused in this attack scenario.  We proposed an access policy 
and syntactic policy rule for the addOrUpdateLink() and deleteLinks() APIs of the 
Floodlight’s link discovery module.   
4.1.3  Robustness Test for the Controller 
 In this case study, the controller application is introducing memory leakage which 
is causing the controller to crash with an out-of-memory error [13].  The controller does 
not limit the memory used by the application and hence the controller eventually runs out 
of memory.  In this attack scenario, the controller APIs which are responsible for 
allocating resources for the controller modules are getting misused.  This model proposes 
an approach to handle such scenarios with the help of AEGIS implementation. 
 
4.2  Network Topology Attacks 
This threat model covers three network topology attack scenarios.   
4.2.1  Denial-of-Service Attack 
In this attack scenario we implemented a TCP SYN Flood attack and port scan 
attack on the Floodlight controller.  The attacker scans Ports 1 through 1024 of the victim 
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machine.  It then continuously sends TCP SYN packets to the victim machine on the 
open ports such as Port 22 and Port 80, so as to utilize all the resources of the victim 
machine, thus crippling the victim machine and preventing it from actually being able to 
reply to any kind of valid traffic that it would receive.   
The Floodlight controllers forwarding module is responsible for making the packet 
forwarding decisions such as FORWARD_OR_FLOOD, FORWARD, MULTICAST, 
DROP or taking no action.  The forwarding module’s createMatchFromPacket API 
constructs a specific match based on the deserialized OFPacketIn payload.  It uses the 
source MAC address, destination MAC address, and other IP and TCP header fields to 
create a match for the received packet.  However, it does not take into consideration the 
switch inPort or the TCP packet type while making a decision.  Hence, the spoofed TCP 
SYN messages match the existing flow rules and forward them to the target host.  This 
study proposes semantic, syntactic and communication policies for the 
createMatchFromPacket API using AEGIS policy engine implementation. 
4.2.2  Backdoor Attack 
 The attack was implemented using the fundamentals of ARP spoofing.  The main 
assumption that was made while implementing this attack was that the attacker was 
aware of the IP address of the intended victim and compromised host in the local 
environment.  The attacker uses a gratuitous ARP request to probe the compromised 
host’s MAC address. Then, it generates the spoofed ICMP messages towards the 
compromised host and uses victim’s host machine as a destination. 
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 The Floodlight controller’s device manager module creates device entities database 
entries based upon MAC addresses seen in the network and tracks network addresses 
mapped to the device and their location within the network.  The device manager’s 
getSourceEntityFromPacket method retrieves device entity information from the packet.  
Based on this, the learnDeviceByEntity method does a lookup in the device entity 
database of the device manager module.  The lookup is based on the device key which is 
created using the host’s MAC address.  However, for the spoofed ICMP requests with the 
wrong MAC address, this lookup matches an existing entity.  The implemented AEGIS 
policies protect this API and show the results, wherein they also check for the host’s 
attachment point on the switch port to perform a lookup for the device entity. 
4.2.3  Host Location Hijacking Attack 
 In this attack scenario, an adversary exploits the host tracking Service in the 
OpenFlow network [11].  The attacker host makes use of an unimplemented method of 
the controller to generate this attack scenario.  The adversary tampers with the host 
location information of the controller to break the security and impersonate the target 
host.  In this attack scenario, all traffic for the web server running on the target host is 
routed to the attacker host. 
 This study found that the attacker makes use of unimplemented methods of the 
Floodlight controller which return a positive result in either case and does not perform 
any validation checks.  The isEntityAllowed is one such unimplemented API which is 
being misused in this attack scenario.  Inside AEGIS hook for this API, we implemented 
a security module which detects the host migration scenario and prevents unimplemented 
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API’s misuse.  Table I summarizes our threat model and lists the controller APIs which 
are being misused for these attack scenarios. 
 
TABLE I.  Threat model and misused controller APIs 
 
 
 
  
# Attack Module Floodlight APIs OpenDaylight APIs 
1 
Crashing SDN 
controller 
System Exit Exit 
2 
Abusing 
controller’s 
security 
Link discovery 
manager 
rowsDeleted rowsDeleted 
3 
Robustness test for 
the controller 
Memory new new 
4 
Denial-of-Service 
attack 
Forwarding  
processPacketIn
Message 
createMatchFro
mPacket 
processPacketInMess
age 
5 Backdoor attack Device manager 
learnDeviceByE
ntity 
getSourceEntityFrom
Packet 
6 
Host location 
hijacking attack 
Host tracking 
service 
isEntityAllowed  isEntityAllowed  
switchPortChang
ed 
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Chapter 5:  Implementation of Network and Application Attacks 
We developed a prototype system based on our design to secure the controller APIs 
from application bugs and network attacks.  This implementation has one network 
application attack scenario which is based on the Rosemary [9] test for an application-
calling exit API to bring the controller down and a network attack scenario which is 
based on TopoGard [16] experiments for poisoning an SDN network.  We also proposed 
a new network attack scenario, a backdoor attack, which is based on an ARP cache 
poisoning attack.  We used the Floodlight controller for our experiments.  We then 
identified a set of controller APIs which are causing these attacks.  We defined policies 
for these APIs and showed that applying these policies has saved the controller from 
getting misused by these network attacks and application bugs. 
 
5.1  Experimental Environment for Application Bug 
 To test the controller’s stability and security against application bugs, and an API 
misuse scenario, we have set up the test environment as shown in Figure 2. This setup is 
similar to the Rosemary’s test setup for testing the controller’s robustness [13].  We 
chose the Floodlight controller as our main target; however, as described in the Rosemary 
paper [13], such attack scenarios are also possible with the OpenDaylight and other 
leading open source controllers.  Our aim is to create a similar attack scenario using the 
Floodlight controller and prevent these attacks with the help of our AEGIS 
implementation.  We set up the SDN controller connected to the OpenFlow switch and 
two hosts, H1 and H2.  Here, we run the controller with a modified application to test the 
34 
 
robustness and security.  The modified applications are misusing the controller APIs to 
create an outbreak. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Evaluation environment for network application bug 
 
Following are the steps that we need to perform to run the Floodlight SDN controller 
with AEGIS implementation: 
1. Update Java libraries. 
2. Install Spring tool [26] for building and running the Floodlight controller code. 
3. Download and build the Floodlight controller. 
4. Set up the Spring target to execute the controller. 
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5.2  Crashing SDN Controller 
 To demonstrate that an application bug or improperly called controller API may 
cause SDN controller instability, we modified the existing application of the controller.  
We used the Rosemary’s [10] testing Floodlight controller robustness test case, in which 
the controller program exits suddenly.  In this example the developer inadvertently calls 
the system exit or return function.  We modified the topology manager code to 
inadvertently call the System.exit() API.  We then ran the controller and connected the 
OpenFlow switch with the controller and two hosts.  When the hosts are inserted into this 
SDN network, the controller’s topology manager module calls the updateTopology() API 
and performs certain actions for this topology update, and eventually calls the 
System.exit() API.  In this case, the controller stops working as soon as the topology 
manager calls the System.exit() API.  We then replaced this controller with the Floodlight 
controller that has an AEGIS implementation.  We defined the access policies for calling 
the System.exit() API.  In this case, except for the controller’s main module, no other 
module is allowed to call the System.exit() API.  The results show that although the 
topology manager tries to execute the exit function, since it does not have access policy 
defined by AEGIS, it won’t be able to execute it and the controller continues to run 
normally without shutting down.  Figure 3 shows that the topology manager is calling the 
System.Exit() API after updating the topology and Figure 4 shows that the controller 
shutdowns after that.  
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Fig. 3.  Topology manager calling System.exit() API at updateTopology event 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Floodlight controller exiting due to System.exit() API call 
 
5.3  Case Study: Poisoning Internal Data of the Controller 
 The controller maintains various types of network information with its execution 
instance. Applications can call controller APIs to manipulate this internal information.  
Such unauthorized access may lead to effective loss of the network.  A study by 
Rosemary [13] shows that the network link information can be modified or deleted using 
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a simple test application.  Thus, a simple rough application can easily confuse other 
important network applications. 
In this attack scenario, the vulnerable application is changing the controller’s internal 
information such as the network link information.  To protect the controller’s internal 
data, it is essential to have a permission set for each of the applications.  For example, a 
test application should not have write or modify operation permission for the network 
link information of the controller, and corresponding controller APIs for performing 
modify or delete operations.  We identified the controller APIs which were being misused 
in this attack scenario.  We proposed a permission set, access policy rule and syntactic 
policy rule for the addOrUpdateLink() and deleteLinks() APIs of the Floodlight’s link 
discovery module. 
  
5.4  Case Study: Resource Leak for the Controller 
 The resource leak could be of multiple types: application allocating memory, 
network attacks utilizing controller resources, and bugs existing in the controller internal 
module.  The memory used by the controller is an important performance factor.  A 
syntactic policy defines validation for the input parameter, and a communication policy 
defines validation for the amount of memory requested and the number of times this API 
is called, implementing these will resolve this issue.  In the robustness experiment with 
the Rosemary [13], researchers have created a linked list without bounds checking and 
the controller eventually runs out of memory.  Creating a communication policy for a list 
creation API and validating a syntactic policy will resolve this issue. 
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Fig. 5.  Network setup for implementing network attacks 
 
5.5  Experimental Environment for Network Attack Generation 
 The experimental lab setup consists of 3 hosts as shown in Figure 5. One of the hosts 
is set up as the Floodlight controller while another host is configured as an Open vSwitch. 
Attacker, victim and compromised host machines are connected to the Open vSwitch to 
simulate a LAN environment.  Figure 5 shows the detailed network setup. 
 The next component of the setup is the Open vSwitch instance.  Open vSwitch 
connects the SDN controller using OpenFlow protocol and it is capable of running on a 
linux-based environment.  The machine on which the switch is installed was fitted with 
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the additional virtual interfaces so that it could support connections to multiple hosts to 
emulate a physical switch based on the OpenFlow protocol.   
 Next we went on with the installation of required additional software on each of the 
hosts, the controller and the switch.  We installed monitoring tools like Wireshark to 
accompany the TCPDump utility for the packet analysis once they had been captured on 
the respective machines.  Also to emulate the flow of traffic, we used a packet generator 
called PackETH and Scapy tool [24], [25].  With these utilities, we were able to simulate 
various kinds of traffic requests from one machine to another.  The scripts were written in 
python, using Scapy library, to perform the attacks and run on a host in the network. 
 
5.6  Case Study: Denial-of-Service Attack 
 In this attack, the experimental topology uses two hosts.  The port-scan attack was 
initiated from the attacker’s host to attack the victim’s host.  The script scans Ports 1 
through 1024 of the Victim host.  The traffic is captured on the interfaces of the switch 
and the hosts and the timestamps are used for the analysis.  The attack was implemented 
using the Scapy utility [25].  Then the denial-of-service attack was generated by having 
the attacker machine send a continuous stream of SYN packets to the victim machine on 
Port 22 and Port 80 so as to utilize all the resources of the victim machine, thus crippling 
the victim machine from actually being able to reply to any kind of valid traffic that it 
would receive.  TCPDump was run on both the hosts and each of the interfaces of the 
switch to capture the traffic flowing through the network.  We used this captured traffic 
to do further analysis of the network. 
40 
 
 
5.7  Implementing a Backdoor Attack 
 The controller was set up and the Open vSwitch was configured to communicate 
with the controller on the dedicated Port 6653 on which the controller listens for 
incoming connections from the switch.  An Open vSwitch bridge was created with a port 
to communicate with the controller and had additional ports for establishing connections 
with the hosts in the network.  Once the bridge was established, we mapped the virtual 
bridge ports to the actual ports of the machine and installed routes indicating the interface 
to be used for each host connected to the switch for the proper functioning of the 
experimental topology.  We issued ping requests from the machines to each other to see 
the flows that were being pushed by the controller onto the switch to enable 
communication between the hosts present in the network.  It was noted that the first ping 
would take about 3 times longer to reach the destination as compared to rest of the pings.  
This was the expected response, as the first packet is always sent to the controller for the 
pushing of the control flow so that the next packets that would arrive for that particular 
destination would be directly forwarded according to the pre-installed flows in the switch 
by the controller.  Also for every new combination of the source and the destination 
address, a new flow would be installed in the switch for further communication between 
the end points.  As shown in the Figure 6, the Floodlight controller identifies three hosts 
in the network. 
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Fig. 6.  Floodlight web interface showing hosts connected to the switch 
 
5.8  Generating a Back Door Attack 
 The attack was implemented using the fundamentals of ARP spoofing. The main 
assumption that was made while implementing this attack was that the attacker was 
aware of the IP address of the intended victim and the compromised host in the local 
environment. We used the PackETH utility to create gratuitous ARP request packets for 
the compromised host from the attacker. Once the compromised host would reply to the 
ARP request, the attacker would receive the MAC address of the compromised host.  
Figure 7 shows the flow of a gratuitous ARP request and a reply. 
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Fig. 7.  Flow of a gratuitous ARP request and reply 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Gratuitous ARP request 
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Fig. 9.  Gratuitous ARP reply 
 Figure 8 and 9 shows ARP packets received on the attacker’s host.  Using this 
information along with the help of the PackETH utility, we sent a fixed number of 
packets to the victim machine from the attacker using the spoofed information of the 
compromised host.  By using the Wireshark tool, we confirmed that the victim machine 
was receiving the ICMP packets and the compromised host was receiving the response to 
these pings from the victim machine.  On the switch, only the flow rule for gratuitous 
ARP was registered.  No other flow rule was being pushed on the switch from the 
controller.  
  So the attacker was flying under the radar with this attack as no flow rules from the 
attacker machine towards the intended victim was pushed on the switch by the controller.  
This proved that the detection of the attacker was difficult in this condition. Figure 10 
shows the backdoor attack using ICMP Ping. 
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Fig. 10.  Attack using ICMP ping 
 
5.9  Implementing Host Location Hijacking Attack 
 In this attack scenario, the attacker spoofs the network to exploit the Host Tracking 
Service (HTS) of the OpenFlow Network.  HTS maintains a host profile for each of the 
hosts to track the network mobility and it monitors packet-in messages to detect the 
motion of the hosts.  However, due to lack of authentication and unimplemented empty 
API of the controller’s device manager module, attacker was able to sniff the network 
traffic of another host.  A similar attack scenario is implemented by the TopoGuard that 
exploits the isEntityAllowed API of the Floodlight controller [11].  This API accepts 
every update instead of blocking possible spoofing attacks.  Such security is easy to break 
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by impersonating the target host.  All OpenFlow controllers use HTS service to make the 
packet forwarding decision.  This is the main reason that adversary can hijack any host in 
the network. 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Attacker impersonates a web server to phish user 
The attacker generates packets with the same identifier as the target web server.  The 
controller believes that the target host has been moved to a new location and it updates 
the host profile for this host.  The new traffic for the genuine host will be forwarded to 
the attacker’s host.  The web clients harvesting attack is a practical example of exploiting 
the HTS [11]. 
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(a) Connected to genuine server         (b) Connected to attackers server 
Fig. 12.  Web clients harvesting attack 
 
 In the experimental setup shown in the Figure 11, we have an OpenFlow network 
with the Floodlight controller which has HTS service.  We deployed a web server with 
the IP address “11.0.0.8” and the attacker host is present in the same network.  An 
attacker host also runs a web server.  Before the attack, the web client is able to reach the 
genuine server at a designated IP address and a port, as shown in Figure 12 (a).  Then, the 
attacker sends an ARP request to probe the MAC address of the “11.0.0.8” host.  We then 
used the PackETH utility to generate fake packets using this MAC address and IP address 
“11.0.0.8” [24].  After that, we see all new requests by the web client going to the 
attacker’s web server, as shown in the Figure 12 (b).   
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Chapter 6:  Overview of AEGIS 
To protect the controller APIs and avoid any misuse, we implemented AEGIS.  The 
main principle behind AEGIS is to validate the controller API’s access and protect it 
from being misused.  AEGIS will be executed before the actual API and it identifies a set 
of policies and rules which are applicable for this API.  Then, AEGIS invokes the policy 
engine to validate policies and rules.  If all the validations are successful, then AEGIS 
returns control to the actual controller API and continues execution.  AEGIS invocation is 
also possible at the post execution of the controller API.  At this point, we can validate 
for returned information by the controller.  This allows validation of both request and 
response information of the controller API. 
Hooking is a technique used to alter the behavior of the software program.  It can be 
used for intercepting the function call and events.  The code which does this is called a 
“hook.”  This technique is used for debugging the code, intercepting the system call, and 
sometimes for doing malicious activities such as implementing a rootkit.  A hook can be 
inserted at runtime or while creating executables of the software. 
An API hooking is a technique by which we can modify the flow of API calls.  We 
proposed an AEGIS which is based on the API hooking technique.  Here we can gain 
control over the controller APIs, validate the parameters passed to the API, and perform 
policy checking.  Figure 13 shows the high level system architecture for AEGIS. 
 AEGIS can be divided into three parts: 
6.1  Hooked API 
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These are the software hooks and the point of entry to AEGIS system that are used 
for extending controller APIs’ functionality.  Hooked APIs are invoked at runtime 
whenever a controller API that is protected by AEGIS is called.  Hooked APIs can be 
executed prior and after call to the controller API.  When executed prior to the controller 
API, they validates the arguments passed and invokes the policy engine.  If executed after 
the controller API, they validates return values and invokes the policy engine if required.  
Hooked APIs can also be used to completely overtake the controller API; that means, 
instead of executing a controller API, we can only execute the hook and return 
parameters. 
 
6.2  Policy Engine 
 The policy engine identifies the set of rules that need to be validated for a particular 
controller API.  It also finds the policy rule from the policy rule database and performs 
validation of the API parameters.  It validates the API parameters for static, syntactic, 
access, and communication policy rules. 
 
6.3  Policy Rule database 
 This database contains controller APIs and a set of policies applicable to those APIs.  
API policies are maintained in the hash table where a name of the controller API is the 
key to the hash function.  The hash value contains API parameters and a set of policies 
for those parameters.  
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 When network applications request access to the controller APIs, they first hits the 
controller’s hooked API.  The hooked API triggers AEGIS and policy engine.  After 
returning from AEGIS a call to the controller API may be executed.  Similarly, when 
interface plug-ins try to access controller APIs, they first land at the controller APIs and 
invoke AEGIS.  The policy engine communicates with the policy rules database and 
retrieves information for APIs and parameters.  Figure 13 shows a high level overview of 
AEGIS implementation.   
 
 
Fig. 13.  High level overview of AEGIS  
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Chapter 7:  AEGIS System Design 
We implemented AEGIS for the Floodlight controller using the Java API hooking 
technique and an AspectJ language.  For the current implementation, we chose the 
statistics manager, topology manager and the host tracker module of the Floodlight 
controller.  The policy engine is a new module in the Floodlight controller written in Java 
and AspectJ.  The hooked APIs check each of the input-output parameters against the set 
of policy rules.  Although our current implementation is specific to the Floodlight 
controller, this design can be adapted to other controllers.  Figure 14 shows the complete 
architecture of AEGIS implementation. 
AEGIS policy engine defines a set of policy functions for validating policies for API 
access.  Hooked controller APIs trigger the policy engine to validate API usage.  The 
policy engine gathers the controller’s invariants such as controller configuration, the list 
of registered modules, etc. from the policy rules database.  Also, AEGIS defines 
syntactic, semantic, and access policy rules for module communication.  
The policy engine performs four different types of policy rules [14] validations: 
1. Access policy rules:  these are for controlling the API’s access by modules and 
applications. This rule defines which module or application has access to which 
API of the controller. 
2. Syntactic policy rules:  these are for verifying static and invariant data such as 
protocol ID, and system configuration data passed to the controller API. 
3. Semantic policy rules:  these are applied to dynamic data objects and they define 
the range of values for a data object. 
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4. Communications policy rules:  these rules describe the sequence of operation for 
the communications between two modules. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  AEGIS system architecture 
 
7.1  Policy Rules Database 
A policy rules database is maintained by AEGIS which contains controller APIs and 
corresponding access permissions and invariant variables.  It is maintained in a hash table 
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and uses an API name as the key to fetch entries from the hash table.  The policy engine 
retrieves access policies from the database and applies policy rules to the API parameter.  
 
7.2  Policy Interpreter 
The policy interpreter reads the policies from the policy database and loads them 
into the controller memory.  These policies are used by the policy executor for executing 
each of the policies inside the API hook.  Policy interpreter also fetches permission sets 
for the applications and loads them into the controller memory, and monitors the policy 
database for any further changes. 
 
7.3  Policy Rules 
 Policy rules are the validation procedures for API execution and are divided into four 
categories [14]: 
7.3.1  Access Policy Rules 
 Access policies are defined by doing a static analysis of the controller code and 
identifying which application or module has access to which API of the controller.  We 
identified the important APIs of the core modules and the legitimate modules and 
applications which can access those APIs.  This is done with tools such as Eclipse to 
identify the caller of the controller APIs.  AEGIS maintains the “permission.csv” file and 
writes access policies for each API and modules in this file.  AEGIS reads this file at the 
controller startup and store it in a policy database.  Inside the API hook, AEGIS dumps 
the call stack at runtime and identifies which module is calling the controller API.  It then 
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looks up the policy database to identify a permission set for this API.  If the permission 
set for the calling module contain a valid value such as read or write, then AEGIS checks 
the further policies.  If the access policy is not set, no further execution of this API is 
required and the API hook returns a failure response.  Any changes to the access 
permission can be taken care of dynamically by AEGIS.  For example, if there are any 
changes in the “permission.csv” file, AEGIS updates the policy database and any further 
access for this API will be handled accordingly. 
7.3.2  Syntactic Policy Rules 
 Syntactic policies define the use of the invariant data for the parameters.  An 
invariant is a property that holds at a certain point or points in a program; these are often 
seen in assert statements, documentation, and formal specifications [19].  The current 
implementation of AEGIS involves study of the controller code to identify the invariants.  
However, AEGIS implementation can be enhanced to use a static analysis tool to identify 
the invariants in the controller code and keep this invariant information inside the policy 
database.  To do this, the Daikon invariant detector can be used to identify the controller 
invariants [19].  The controller can be executed inside the Daikon environment for the 
first time and generated invariants can be collected into the policy database.  Hooked 
APIs and policy engine do validate the invariants passed to the controller APIs against 
the values from the policy database.  Any malicious values will be detected and access to 
the controller API will be blocked. 
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7.3.3  Semantic Policy Rules 
 Semantic policies are defined for the dynamic data which are changing within the 
range.  IP address, port and configuration data are examples of dynamic data.  We 
identified the dynamic data for the important controller APIs and performed validation 
checking for each of these dynamic data.  Although this is a manual effort, it is useful for 
identifying the malicious values passed to the API.  This policy implementation needs 
complete understanding of the controller code and data range values.  However, module 
implementers will be able to identify the exact range of the values passed to the API.  
7.3.4  Communication Policy Rules 
 Communication policies define the flow of execution of requests.  These policies 
identifies the state of the protocol while communicating between two modules.  For 
example, the host should not move to different switch ports without proper termination of 
the current port.  These policies will detect any such violations in communication 
between two modules or interfaces.  Hooked APIs will maintain the state of the 
communication for verification. 
 
7.4  Permission Set 
 Applications and controller modules have a set of read, write and delete permissions 
for accessing controller modules, APIs and internal data.  For example, the topology 
monitoring application can only read the link information and network statistics 
information from the controller and should not be performing any write or modify 
operation on the controller’s statistics information.  For each of the controller 
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applications, a permission set will be defined for all the modules to which it has access.  
Table II shows a sample permission set for the Floodlight controller applications.  For 
example, the circuit pusher application has direct access to the static flow pusher module 
of the Floodlight controller and can perform read, write and delete operations on flow 
rules.  However, it does not have access to any other controller module APIs.  Also, the 
access control list (ACL) application can perform a read operation for statistics module.  
That means the ACL application can call the “get” APIs of the statistics module; 
however, it is not allowed to call “put” or “delete” APIs. 
 
TABLE II.  Permission set for Floodlight controller applications 
Application Allowed 
Modules 
Permission 
Set 
Description 
Virtual 
Switch [22] 
Statistics Read Is a network virtualization application 
used for creation of multiple logical 
layer 2 networks. 
Flow Rule Read, Write, 
Delete 
Circuit 
Pusher [23] 
Flow Rule Read,  
Write, 
Delete 
Based on IP address and priority, it 
creates a bidirectional circuit. 
ACL 
(stateless 
FW) [24] 
Flow Rules Read, Write, 
Delete 
Applies ACL rules (Access Control 
List) for the OpenFlow switches using 
flow rules and by monitoring ingress 
traffic. 
Statistics Read 
 
Appendix A contains a complete list of the OpenDaylight controller applications and 
a permission set for them. 
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7.5  Algorithm for Executing AEGIS 
 The policy engine is invoked by the API hook and it first checks any defined policies 
for this API and executes policies inside the API hook.  The algorithm for execution of 
the API hook is as shown below. 
Step 1: Before executing the actual API, invoke the API hook. 
Step 2: Inside the hook, validate the permission set for this API access and if it is 
valid then extract the input parameters. 
Step 3: Check if access policy is set for this API; if yes, then go to step 4, or else go 
to step 5. 
Step 4: Retrieve allowed modules for this API and check if the caller of this API is in 
the list of allowed modules.  If the caller is not in the list of allowed modules, 
then do not execute this API and go to step 9, or else go to step 5. 
Step 5: If semantic policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy engine code 
for this API which do validate the input parameters, or else go to step 6. 
Step 6: If syntactic policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy engine code 
for this API which do validate the input parameters for syntactic policy, or 
else go to step 7. 
Step 7: If communication policy is defined for this API, then execute the policy 
engine code for this API, which does validate of the communication 
parameters, or else go to step 8. 
Step 8: Proceed with the execution of the API. 
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Step 9: If the exit policy is defined for the API, then validate the return/output 
parameter of the API.  If required, change the output parameter value. 
Step 10: Exit from the hook. 
Appendix B contains pseudo code for the implementation of AEGIS and Figure 15 
shows AEGIS execution flow chart.  
 
7.6  Policy Language 
 Our policy language defines several basic components as shown in the Table III.  A 
policy for the API can be written as,  
      , T, I,      
 For example, the policy for the System.exit() API, 
                            , write, null,         
 states that, an access policy A is defined for the System.exit() API and the main 
module is the only allowed caller of this API which has the write permission for this API 
access.  There are no (null) input or output parameters that are validated for this API. 
 Using such a definition, users of the controller can define new policies for the APIs 
and apply them using AEGIS.  However, the validation checks are feasible and left up to 
the implementation of the particular API for better flexibility of design. 
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TABLE III.  Policy language 
Language Description 
X :: = {x1, x2, … } for 
all x(i)  controller 
API’s 
X is a set of all controller APIs for which we are defining 
policies. 
P = { A, S, Y, C, E } P is a set of policies that are applicable for this API 
A = { m1, m2, … } A is an access policy that defines a list of allowed modules/ 
callers m1, m2, … for this API access 
S ::= { I, V } S is a semantic policy which defines validation checks for 
dynamic input arguments I 
Y ::= { I, V } Y is a syntactic policy which defines validation checks for 
invariants input arguments I 
C ::= { I, V } C is a communication policy which defines sequence of 
validation checks on input arguments I 
E ::= { R, V } E is an exit policy for the API and defines a set of validation 
checks V on output parameters R 
V = { v1, v2, … } V is an set of validation checks v1, v2, … for the input 
parameters I of the API.  Each of these operations is API 
implementation specific and should be defined based on each 
API.  For the flexibility of implementation, our policy 
language does not restrict validation checks 
T ::= { read, write, delete 
} 
T is a permission set which can be a set of read, write, or 
delete  defined for the caller of this API 
I = { a1, a2, … } I is list of input arguments a1, a2, … for this API  
R ::= r R is return value/parameter r of the API 
policy :: =       , T, I,      
 
A policy defines a set of policies P applicable for the API X 
and its input parameters I, output parameters R, and a 
permission set T is defined for the caller of this API 
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Fig. 15.  Execution of AEGIS 
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Chapter 8:  Implementation of AEGIS  
AEGIS is based on the fact that during the network attacks, or when any application 
tries to misuse the controller APIs, the API input/output parameters or the API execution 
flow are more abnormal than the usual.  AEGIS implementation involves four steps; the 
first step is to identify the important APIs of the controller.  The second step is to analyze 
the input and output parameters of these APIs.  The third step is to define the policies for 
the input and output parameters and API's flow of execution.  The fourth step is to write a 
hook for the controller API which triggers at runtime and invokes the policy engine to 
verify the policies.  We will discuss each of these steps in detail. 
 
8.1  Identifying the Important APIs 
 The important APIs of the controller are the ones which make changes on the 
controller’s data structure.  These include mostly the APIs which do write, update and 
modify operations.  Get or read operations are not very serious as they only make the 
controller information available to other modules or applications.  Apart from these, 
critical system APIs are also important, such as Exit() for terminating the controller’s 
execution and new() for allocating the memory. 
 Network attacks and applications will try to misuse these APIs to generate an attack 
scenario.  For example, when the topology manager tries to call the Exit() API, it is an  
abnormal flow of the execution for the Exit() API.  The normal flow of the execution is 
through the main module of the controller.  When a network attack such as a backdoor 
attack occurs, the attacker tries to make use of the existing flow rules on the controller to 
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bypass the security verification.  Wrong values for the input switch port and source MAC 
address are pass to the controller APIs such as isEntityAllowed() and 
handlePacketInEvent().  These attacks are able to bypass security because such 
verifications are not implemented for these controller APIs and hence, we see these APIs 
being misused.  Our first step towards implementation is to identify such important 
controller APIs.  Also, the open source community does not implement a few APIs.  They 
simply return default results irrespective of the inputs.  They leave the implementation to 
the developers who are using those APIs.  If deployed in the field as they are, attackers 
can use these APIs to generate an attack scenario.  We also identified such 
unimplemented APIs.  Our test results and prior research work shows that the various 
attack scenarios are possible using these APIs. 
 
8.2  Classifying Input and Output Parameters into Variants and Invariants 
 Input parameters given to the function are within a certain range in the case of a 
legitimate calls, whereas the API misuse will try to give invalid inputs.  Classifying input 
and output parameters into invariants and variants is an important step.  Syntactic policies 
are defined for the static or the invariant parameters of the API, whereas semantic 
policies are defined for the variant or the dynamic parameters of the API.  Classifying the 
parameters step involves manual inspection of the important APIs' input and output 
parameters and defining policies for these APIs.  Also, the APIs could be classified with 
the help of a tool such as Daikon [19] to generate variants and invariants of the program. 
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8.3  Defining Policies 
 Defining a policy means to identify which set of rules should be applied to protect 
each of these identified APIs.  The decision to choose the policy is based on the analysis 
of the API, such as the access policy which is required to protect the API from getting 
inadvertently called by the modules other than a legitimate one.  For example, the Exit() 
API should be called by the Main module and not by any other controller module.  A 
syntactic policy should be chosen if API input parameters are invariants, while a semantic 
policy should be chosen for the dynamically changing parameters.  For example, the 
static information such as an IP address, a port number and a switch interface number are 
the parameters which can be put under the syntactic policy.  The dynamically changing 
address range and flow entry can be kept under the semantic policy.  The communication 
policies are used to verify if any of the parameter is not violating the execution of the 
flow of the protocol.  For example, if any of the network link is migrating from one 
switch port to the other switch port without proper shutdown of the link, this is 
considered as a violation of the communication policy.  APIs which handle link-level 
information, flow rules, and host tracking come under the communication policy. 
 
8.4  Applying Policies 
 Applying the policies involves inserting the defined policies into a policy database, 
which is a simple .csv file that stores the policies.  These policies are read at runtime and 
executed inside the API hook.  We implemented a generic hook which is executed for all 
the controller APIs for that module.  For example, we implemented an API hook for the 
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device manager module which is executed for each of the APIs inside the device manager 
module.  If we have defined a policy for the current API that is being executed inside the 
hook, then corresponding policy is executed, or else it continues the execution of the next 
API hook.   
 
8.5  Securing the Unimplemented Controller APIs 
 The open source community develops products which can be used by the majority of 
vendors and developers.  Their intention is to collaborate on the functionality of the 
controller and bring the product into the market quickly.  Many of these open source 
controllers are developed for academic purposes and later improved for industrial 
requirements.  Many of the open source controllers do not implement a code which is 
vendor-implementation-dependent.  For example, topology management is not included 
in any of the OpenFlow specifications [8].  Some part of the code is left for the individual 
vendors to implement according to their own network requirements.  However, due to the 
lack of proper documentation by the open source community and individual developers' 
incomplete understanding of the code, many of these unimplemented codes add 
vulnerability to the SDN network.  Consequently, these software bugs remain unseen.  
The attackers make use of these unseen software bugs to break into the network.  
Unimplemented APIs are the major target of the attackers and our study shows some of 
the attack scenarios.  Identifying the unimplemented APIs of any controller and 
implementing them before deploying the controller into the network is very important.   
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TABLE IV.  Unimplemented APIs of the floodlight controller 
Module API Default 
Return 
Description 
Topology 
Manager 
handleMiscellaneo
usPeriodicEvents 
void Ideally it should add periodic events 
required by the topology but doesn’t 
transitionToStandb
y 
void Ideally it should send the notification if 
the controller's initial role was ACTIVE 
and the controller is now transitioning to 
STANDBY but doesn’t  
addOrUpdateSwitc
h 
void Ideally it should update the concerning 
switch disconnect and port down should 
not be processed but doesn’t 
addOrUpdateTunn
elLink 
void It is called in add or update methods of the 
link handling operation; however, this API 
ignores the tunnel links 
Topology 
instance 
isAllowed true Always returns true rather than validating 
the topology changes 
inSameBroadcastD
omain 
false Irrespective of checking if it has the same 
broadcast domain, it returns false 
getAllowedOutgoi
ngBroadcastPort 
null Does not return null if the input dst is not 
allowed by the higher-level topology. This 
method should provide the topologically 
equivalent broadcast port. 
getAllowedIncomi
ngBroadcastPort 
null Does not return null if the input src 
broadcast domain port is not allowed for 
incoming broadcast. This method should 
provide the topologically equivalent 
incoming broadcast-allowed. 
Device 
Manager 
isEntityAllowed true Returns true in either case rather than 
validating device entity migration in the 
OpenFlow network 
Forwardi
ng 
getModuleServices null Returns null rather than returning the list 
of interfaces that this module implements. 
getServiceImpls null Returns null rather than instantiating (as 
needed) and returning objects that 
implement each of the services exported 
by this module. 
Link 
Discover
y 
isTunnelPort false Does not perform any validation for the 
Tunnel Port 
isLinkAllowed True Always returns true rather than validating 
the link attachment point in the OpenFlow 
network 
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We identified the important unimplemented APIs of the Floodlight controller and 
predicted the potential misuse scenarios for these APIs.  Table IV shows the list of some 
important unimplemented Floodlight controller APIs and the description of the 
corresponding APIs. 
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Chapter 9:  Validating Defense for Attack Scenarios 
 AEGIS protects the controller APIs from being misused.  The key feature of AEGIS 
implementation is that the controller API’s code remains the same and the applications 
call the existing controller API.  However, since the controller APIs are hooked by 
AEGIS, instead of the controller API, the hooked APIs are called.  Inside the API hook, 
the policy engine executes and validates the API usage.  Thus, validating the defense for 
the attack scenarios involves applying policies to the misused APIs and executing the 
SDN controller with AEGIS implementation.  AEGIS and new policies for the controller 
APIs helps to validate the API usage and detect any misuse scenario.  Rerunning the 
attack scenarios with AEGIS implementation on the Floodlight controller shows that 
AEGIS successfully prevent API misuse when the network is attacked or applications try 
to perform outbreaks on the controller.   
 
9.1  Preventing System Crash Scenario 
 In our attack scenario, the controller shuts down after the topology manager 
advertently calls System.exit() API.  We defined access policy for System.exit() API as: 
                            , write, null,         
 which states that, an access policy “A” is defined for the System.exit() API and the 
“Main” module is the only allowed caller of this API and it has “write” permission for 
access to this API.  And, there are no (null) input or output parameters that are validated 
for this API. 
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 Due to the unsuccessful execution of the policy, this access will be blocked by 
AEGIS, and as shown in Figure 16, the controller continues to execute as anticipated.  
However, in the case of lawful controller termination such as failure in a binding 
controller to the designated IP address and port, this API is triggered by the main module 
and the controller shuts down, as shown in the Figure 17. 
 
  
Fig. 16.  Controller continues to run although the topology manager calls Exit() API 
 
  
Fig. 17.  Main module is allowed to call Exit() API. 
9.2  Detecting and Preventing Backdoor Attack 
In the case of a backdoor attack, the attacker generates spoofed ICMP packets.  The 
attacker then targets two different hosts in the network to send ICMP requests using an 
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impersonated source as a compromised host’s IP address and MAC, and destination as a 
victim host.  To detect and prevent this attack scenario, it is important to detect the 
spoofed packets.  The Floodlight controller’s device manager module creates device 
entities database entries based upon MAC addresses seen in the network and tracks 
network addresses mapped to the device and their location within the network.  The 
device manager’s getSourceEntityFromPacket method retrieves device entity information 
from the packet.  Based on this, the learnDeviceByEntity method does a lookup in the 
device entity database of the device manager module.  The lookup is based on a device 
key, which is created using the host’s MAC address.  However, for a spoofed ICMP 
request with a wrong MAC address, this lookup matches an existing entity.  
Implementation of AEGIS policies protects this API and shows results, wherein it 
additionally checks for the host’s attachment point on the switch port while performing a 
lookup for the device entity. 
 The defined policy for the learnDeviceByEntity() API is 
                                                                         , null, 
        ,           
which states that a syntactic policy, “Y,” is defined for the learnDeviceByEntity() 
API with condition check as “entity’s switch port does not belong to the existing device 
entity in the entity database.”  There is no (null) permission set defined for this API 
access; that means no validation is being done for the caller.  An input parameter “entity” 
and an output parameter “device” are validated for this API. 
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With this policy validation, when a spoofed packet is received by the switch, the 
switch forwards this packet to the controller as there is no flow rule entry which matches 
the received packet.  The controller considers this as a new device in the network and 
tries to match it with the existing entity database.  In the absence of this policy it will 
match the device with an existing entry, as it does not take the switch port into the 
consideration.  However, with this policy it will try to match the switch port along with 
the entity but will fail. 
In this case, the API will be invoked and output is set to null if validation fails.  
Figure 18 shows that the controller has detected spoofed ICMP messages which are then 
blocked.  Thus, AEGIS implementation successfully defended a backdoor attack. 
 
 
Fig. 18.  Validation for Backdoor attack. 
 
9.3  Preventing Host Location Hijacking Attack 
In this attack scenario, the attacker hijacks some of the host’s location information in 
the network to give the impression that the host has been moved.  Thus, the controller 
redirects the packets meant for the legitimate hosts to the attacker.  The attacker exploits 
 
Spoofed ICMP Request 
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the unimplemented isEntityAllowed API of the Floodlight controller.  This API accepts 
every update instead of blocking possible spoofing attacks. 
The defined policy for boolean isEntityAllowed(Entity entity, IEntityClass 
entityClass)  API is: 
                                                                         
                                        , null,                     ,            
which states that a syntactic policy, “Y,” is defined for the boolean isEntityAllowed 
(Entity entity, IEntityClass entityClass) API with a condition check as “the entity’s 
switch port does not belong to the existing device entity in the entity database.”  A 
communication policy “C” is defined with a check on “whether the entity’s switch port 
did a valid shutdown before migration.”  No (null) permission set is defined for API’s 
access, which means no validation is being done for the caller.  An input parameter 
“entity” and an output parameter “boolean” are validated for this API. 
When the attacker generates spoofed packets without physically changing the 
location, the controller will detect this behavior.  Inside the API hook, AEGIS returns 
failure response for this API when such an attack is detected.  The controller does not 
update the host’s location information for the attacker, hence preventing possible 
hijacking of the legitimate host.  Figure 19 shows that AEGIS is able to detect the 
malicious host migration and prevent the host location hijacking attack. 
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Fig. 19.  AEGIS detects host migration on the switch port 
  
 
Detecting malicious Host Migration on the switch port 
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Chapter 10:  Discussion 
The controller modules which are responsible for making forwarding, host tracking, 
switching, managing topology and statistics related decisions are at the heart of the 
controller and play a major role in the controller architecture.  Our aim is to protect these 
controller core module APIs which are being used by various north-bound and south-
bound interfaces and other controller modules.  AEGIS defines the policy for accessing 
these APIs, thus protecting the controller from application bugs and network attacks. 
 
10.1  Related Work  
Several approaches have been proposed to protect the controller from application 
bugs and exploitation cases.  The Rosemary controller implements a network application 
containment and resilience strategy and runs applications in a containerized environment, 
thereby having control over the application’s use of controller modules [13].  However, it  
needs the applications and controller code to be refactored so as to accommodate 
container implementation.  We address this critical issue by implementing the API 
hooking technique, which does not need changes in the original application or controller 
code.  We also selected critical attacks generated by the Rosemary researchers in our 
experiments and demonstrated that prevention of such attacks is much easier with AEGIS 
implementation. 
TopoGuard identified a few of the unimplemented APIs of the controller code and 
generated new attack scenarios such as host location hijacking attack [11].  However, the 
TopoGuard implementation does not address a way to protect the controller from 
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misusing other unimplemented APIs.  This thesis identified other unimplemented APIs 
which showed that defining simple policies will protect the controller from other API 
misuse scenarios.  The implementation includes a defense mechanism using a policy 
engine to protect the controller from a host location hijacking attack. 
An access control and policy-based scheme for the SDN controller may help in 
securing the northbound APIs [12].  In particular, a controller needs to be protected from 
network attacks.  This study focused on protecting the controller core modules from 
application as well as network attacks.  This unique approach can be used for protecting 
controller northbound and southbound interfaces as well. 
When multiple applications are deployed in the SDN network, they could create 
conflicting flow rules [28].  An SE-Floodlight implementation with various security 
features includes solution for the conflicting flow rules.  We presented a generic approach 
to solve such issues of the controller security.  A set of policies can be applied to resolve 
many such security threats. 
 
10.2  Performance Comparison 
AEGIS implementation on Floodlight controller involves adding new AspectJ 
library and runtime weaving of the controller APIs.  To determine the effectiveness of 
this implementation, it is important to perform AEGIS performance comparison tests for 
memory usage, API execution time and boot-up time against existing Floodlight 
controller.  These tests are discussed below. 
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10.2.1   Boot-up Time Comparison 
AEGIS loads policies at the boot of the controller and starts the API hooks and 
policy executor.  Hence, it is important to measure performance impact at the controller 
boot-up.  Under the test environment, we measured boot-up time for the Floodlight 
controller with and without AEGIS implementation for various numbers of policies.  The 
timer starts when the controller enters the main() function and ends when it loads all the 
modules including AEGIS module and runs the REST APIs.   
 
 
Fig. 20.  Boot-up time performance analysis for AEGIS implementation 
 
This analysis is done for an average of boot-up time for the fixed number of policies.  
The boot-up time includes additional time required for reading the policy database, 
interpreting policies and starting an AEGIS execution instance.  Figure 20 shows that 
there is an overhead of 2 to 3 seconds for AEGIS to boot-up. This boot-up time increases 
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as we add more policies to AEGIS.  However, the percentage increase in the boot-up time 
is 2.5%.  Also, such overhead is acceptable as boot-up time is trivial for the controller 
performance and our implementation does not add much to it because we implemented a 
hash map to look up the policies from the database.  Storing policies involves O(n) time 
complexity and thus performance remains almost parallel to Floodlight with a slight 
increase in the number of policies. 
 
10.2.2  API Execution Time Comparison   
For verifying AEGIS average API execution overhead, we performed a 
throughput test of the SDN controller with the help of a cbench [29] utility.  cbench 
creates a number of OpenFlow switches, connects to the controller, creates 1000 unique 
source MACs per switch, and measures average throughput for the number of flow rules 
installed per second.  We targeted the learnDeviceByEntity API for which we 
implemented AEGIS policies.  This is invoked when a new host is attached to the 
network and a packet_In event is received from the OpenFlow switch.  The graph shown 
in Figure 21 is for the average API execution time for this API on AEGIS 
implementation and floodlight implementation.  The comparison shows that there is a 
significant increase in the average API execution time.  This is because AspectJ 
implementation for the API hook in Java adds considerable overhead to the API 
execution.  This overhead is proportional to the Floodlight controller’s API usage with 
increasing number of switches.  However, there are around 40 to 50 important APIs for 
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which we need to implement AEGIS.  This number is comparatively less than all APIs of 
the controller.  Thus such overhead will not add much to the controller’s performance. 
 
 
Fig. 21.  Average API execution time comparison 
 
10.2.3  Memory Usage Comparison 
The controller loads all the modules’ jar files into the memory and for the 
throughput test scenario with the cbench utility we see controller memory usage remains 
constant.  For AEGIS implementation, we added AspectJ libraries and the memory usage 
comparison shows that these additional controller libraries add a negligible amount of 
overhead to the controller’s memory usage.  Figure 22 shows a comparison of AEGIS 
implementation against the Floodlight controller. 
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Fig. 22.  Memory usage comparison 
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Inside the hook, AEGIS can collect more debug info and logs from both the 
southbound and northbound APIs without modifying the core APIs.  This can be used for 
collecting more logs and information of the network. 
c) Debugging the live network  
Leveraging the concept of API hooking, AEGIS can implement a live debugger for 
the controller, which will debug the controller when it is live in the network.  
 
However, this technique can be applied to any other northbound or southbound 
interface or module. 
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Chapter 11:  Conclusion and Future Work 
This thesis proposes a generation of network and application attack scenarios with a 
major focus on misusing the SDN controller APIs.  It then systematically investigates the 
solution space and presents AEGIS, which uses a unique technique of automatically 
taking charge of the controller APIs at runtime and validating their usage for the 
applications and other controller modules.  The policy engine and the hooked APIs 
perform dynamic validation of the API parameters.  These hooks can be controlled at 
runtime and configured using AEGIS.  Experimental results show that AEGIS is able to 
prevent network attacks and inadvertent use of the controller APIs by the network 
applications.  It not only validates and prevents the controller API from being misused, 
but it also helps to define standard policy language, which will help in preventing any 
future attack scenarios. 
However, this implementation requires manually creating the policy rules inside the 
policy database.  This process can be automated using static analysis of the controller 
code to extract APIs and their parameters.  The future work will focus on implementing 
static analysis of the controller code to extract controller APIs.  Also, AEGIS 
implementation can be extended to other leading SDN controllers.  The prototype AEGIS 
implementation is able to prevent a few API misuse cases; however, future work would 
focus on implementing AEGIS for all the important controller APIs.  We hope that this 
work will attract more attention from security researchers and we look forward to the 
specifications being standardized with more consideration for SDN security. 
 
80 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] N. Feamster et al. “Software-Defined Network Management.”, Available: 
groups.geni.net/geni/raw-attachment/wiki/.../bismark-gec12.pdf, [May. 23, 2015]. 
 
[2] D. Kreutz, F. Ramos, P. Verissimo. “Towards Secure and Dependable Software-
Defined Networks”, Proceedings of the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Hot 
Topics in Software Defined Networking, HotSDN’13, 2013. 
 
[3] “What’s Software Defined Networking (SDN)?” Internet: 
https://www.sdncentral.com/what-the-definition-of-software-defined-networking-
sdn/, [Jun. 16, 2015]. 
 
[4] “SDN” Internet: http://www.sdncentral.com/flow/sdn-software-defined-networking/, 
[Jun. 16, 2015]. 
 
[5] “Software-Defined Network: The New Norm for Networks”, ONF White Paper, 
2012 Available: https://www.opennetworking.org/images/stories/downloads/sdn-
resources/white-papers/wp-sdn-newnorm.pdf [May. 23, 2015]. 
 
[6] T. Slattery. “Will SDN Be the Future of Network Change Management?” Internet: 
http://www.nojitter.com/post/240160806/will-sdn-be-the-future-of-network-change-
management, Sept 04, 2013 [Jun. 2, 2015]. 
 
[7]   S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu. “Avant-guard: Scalable and vigilant 
switch flow management in software defined networks.” In Proceedings of the 2013 
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security, CCS ’13, 
pages 413–424, 2013. 
 
 [8]  “OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.0”, ONF Specification, June 25, 2012, can be 
found at https://www.opennetworking.org/images/stories/downloads/sdn-
resources/onf-specifications/openflow/openflow-spec-v1.3.0.pdf. 
 
[9]   M. Antikainen, T. Aura, M. Särelä. “Spook in Your Network: Attacking an SDN 
with a Compromised OpenFlow Switch” In Proceedings of the Secure IT Systems, 
19th Nordic Conference, NordSec’14, pages 229-244, Oct 15-17, 2014. 
 
[10] “OpenDaylight Controller:MD-SAL:MD-SAL Document Review:Architecture” 
Internet: https://wiki.opendaylight.org/view/OpenDaylight_Controller:MD-
SAL:MD-SAL_Document_Review:Architecture, [Jul. 19, 2015]. 
 
[11] S. Hong, L. Xu, H. Wang and G. Gu, “Poisoning Network Visibility in Software-
Defined Networks: New Attacks and Countermeasures”, in Proceedings of the 
Network and Distributed System Security, NDSS’15, 2015. 
81 
 
[12] F. Klaedtke, G. Karame, R. Bifulco and H. Cui. “Access Control for SDN 
Controllers”, in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2014 Workshop on Hot Topics 
in Software Defined Networking, HotSDN’14, Chicago, Illinois, USA., Aug. 2014. 
 
[13] S. Shin, Y. Song, T. Lee, S. Lee, J. Chung, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, J. Noh and 
B. Kang, “Rosemary: A Robust, Secure, and High-Performance Network Operating 
System”, in Proceedings of The ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, CCS'14, 2014. 
 
[14] Y. Park, D. Nicol, H. Zhu and C. Lee, “Prevention of Malware Propagation in 
AMI”, in Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2013 IEEE International 
Conference, Vancouver, BC, 2013. 
 
[15] X. Wen, Y. Chen, C. Hu, C. Shi and Y. Wang, “Towards a Secure Controller 
Platform for OpenFlow Applications”, in the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on 
Hot Topics in Software Defined Networking HotSDN’13, 2013. 
 
[16] J. Laan, “Securing the SDN Northbound Interface with the Aid of Anomaly 
Detection”, Project Report at the University of Amsterdam, 2015. 
 
[17] F. Klaedtke, G. Karame, R. Bifulco and H. Cui, “Towards an Access Control 
Scheme for Accessing Flows in SDN”, in Network Softwarization (NetSoft), 2015 
1st IEEE Conference, London, 2015. 
 
[18] S.  Scott-Hayward, C.  Kane and S.  Sezer, “OperationCheckpoint:SDN Application 
Control”, in Network Protocols (ICNP), 2014 IEEE 22nd International Conference, 
Raleigh, NC, 2014. 
 
[19] “The Daikon invariant detector.” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://plse.cs.washington.edu/daikon/. [Oct. 25, 2015]. 
 
[20] P.  Porras, S.  Shin, V.  Yegneswaran, M.  Fong, M.  Tyson and G.  Gu, “A Security 
Enforcement Kernel for OpenFlow Networks”, in Proceedings of the ACM 
SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networking 
(HotSDN’12), August 2012. 
 
[21] S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu. Avant-guard: Scalable and vigilant 
switch flow management in software-defined networks. In Proceedings of the 20th 
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2013. 
 
[22] Project Foodlight, “Virtual Switch”, 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.projectfloodlight.org/virtual-switch/ [Sep. 2, 2015]. 
 
82 
 
[23] Projectf Foodlight, “Circuit Pusher”, 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.projectfloodlight.org/circuit-pusher/ [Sep. 2, 2015]. 
 
[24] PACKETH: GUI and CLI packet generator tool for ethernet. Available: 
http://packeth.sourceforge.net/packeth/Home.html. 
 
[25] Scapy: Packet manipulation program. Available: 
http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/. 
 
[26] Spring: Platform with inbuilt AspecJ libraries for JVM-based systems. Available: 
https://www.spring.io/. 
 
[27] “AspectJ: A seamless aspect-oriented extension to the Java programming language” 
Available: https://www.eclipse.org/aspectj/. 
 
[28] P.  Porras, S.  Cheung, M.  Fong, K.  Skinner and V.  Yegneswaran, “Securing the 
Software-Defined Network Control Layer”, in Proceedings of The 2015 Network 
and Distributed System Security, NDSS ’15, San Diego, CA, USA, 2015. 
 
[29] cbench: Performance Benchmarking tool for the Controller. Available: 
https://www.github.com/andi-bigswitch/oflops/tree/master/cbench. 
  
83 
 
APPENDIX A 
List of permission set for the OpenDaylight controller applications.  This permission 
set is based on our analysis of OpenDaylight controller applications.  However, this 
might change based on the application version and network administrators requirement. 
 
TABLE V.  Permission set for OpenDaylight controller 
ODL 
Applicati
on 
FLO
W 
Entri
es 
OVSD
B 
HostT
racker 
Statisti
cs 
Switch 
Mana
ger 
Topolo
gy 
Manag
er 
Description 
Reservati
on 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read Read  
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
This project is meant to 
provide dynamic low level 
resource reservation so that 
users can get network as a 
service, connectivity or a 
pool of resources (ports, 
bandwidth) for a specific 
period of time. 
Group 
Based 
Policy 
(GBP) 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write 
Read 
Read, 
Write 
Read, - 
The OpenDaylight Group 
Based Policy project 
defines and implements an 
intent system model. 
Process. Automation. 
Network 
Intent 
Composi
tion 
(NIC) 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write 
Read  Read - - 
Network Intent 
Composition project will 
enable the controller to 
manage and direct network 
services and network 
resources based on 
describing the Intent for 
network behaviors and 
network policies 
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TABLE V.  Permission set for OpenDaylight controller 
ODL 
Applicati
on 
FLO
W 
Entri
es 
OVSD
B 
HostT
racker 
Statisti
cs 
Switch 
Mana
ger 
Topolo
gy 
Manag
er 
Description 
Service 
Function 
Chaining 
(SFC) 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write 
- Read - - 
Service Function Chaining 
provides the ability to 
define an ordered list of a 
network services (e.g. 
firewalls, load balancers). 
These service are then 
"stitched" together in the 
network to create a service 
chain. This project provides 
the infrastructure (chaining 
logic, APIs) needed for 
ODL to provision a service 
chain in the network and an 
end-user application for 
defining such chains. 
Virtual 
Tenant 
Network 
(VTN) 
Read, 
Write, 
Delete 
Read, 
Write 
Read Read - - 
OpenDaylight VTN 
provides multi-tenant 
virtual network functions 
on 
OpenDaylight controller. 
OpenDaylight VTN 
consists of two parts: 
VTN coordinator and VTN 
manager. 
 
VTN Coordinator 
orchestrates multiple 
OpenDaylight controllers, 
and provides 
applications with VTN 
API. 
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TABLE V.  Permission set for OpenDaylight controller 
ODL 
Applicati
on 
FLO
W 
Entri
es 
OVSD
B 
HostT
racker 
Statisti
cs 
Switch 
Mana
ger 
Topolo
gy 
Manag
er 
Description 
IoTDM Read - - Read - - 
The IoTDM project is 
about developing a data-
centric middleware that will 
act as a oneM2M compliant 
IoT Data Broker (IOTDM) 
and enable authorized 
applications to retrieve IoT 
data uploaded by any 
device. 
VPN 
Read, 
Write 
Read 
- Read - - 
This project will implement 
the infrastructure services 
required to support L3 VPN 
service 
Device 
Identific
ation and 
Driver 
Manage
ment 
(DIDM) 
Read, 
Write 
Read  Read Read - - 
This project addresses the 
need to provide device 
specific functionality. 
Device specific 
functionality is code that 
performs a “feature”, and 
the code is knowledgeable 
of the capability and 
limitations of the device.  
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APPENDIX B 
Pseudo code for AEGIS Implementation 
1: procedure ISPOLICYSET (api, policy)       check policy is defined for this api 
2:       policylist     policydatabase(api) 
3:       if policylist   policy then        return true if this policy is defined  
4:                                                                    for this api  
5:             return true 
6:       else 
7:             return false 
8:       end if 
9: end procedure 
10:  
11: procedure AEGIS(obj, …)               input obj is an object of the  
12:                                                                     hooked api’s class 
13:      api         get api name of this hook 
14:      caller     get caller of this api  
15:      permissionset       get permission set for this api 
16:      if caller.permissionset   permissionset   then       check permission set 
17:               proceed to next steps 
18:      end if 
19:      if ISPOLICYSET(api, accesspolicy)  then          access policy 
20:   allowedmodules     get allowed modules 
21:             for module 
 
 
     allowedmodules  do 
22:              if caller   module then 
23:                         proceed_flag = true 
24:                   end if 
25:             end for  
26:      end if 
27:      if   proceed_flag != true then 
28:           return  
29:      end if 
30:      if ISPOLICYSET(api, semantic)  then                semantic policy 
31:   params     get object parameters 
32:             for input 
 
 
          do 
87 
 
33:                    compute semantic policy for each input 
34:             end for  
35:      end if 
36:      if ISPOLICYSET(api, syntactic)  then                 syntactic policy 
37:   params     get object parameters 
38:             for input 
 
 
          do 
39:                    compute syntactic policy for each input 
40:             end for  
41:      end if 
42:      if ISPOLICYSET(api, communication)  then          communication policy 
43:   params     get object parameters 
44:             for input 
 
 
          do 
45:                    compute communication policy for each input 
46:             end for  
47:      end if 
48:      if validation  success  then 
49:             returnobj = proceed ( api)                      proceed api execution 
50:             if ISEXITPOLICY(api)  then 
51:                  execute exit policies 
52:             end if 
53:      end if 
54:      return   returnobj 
55: end procedure 
 
 
